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ARTICLES 
GRUTTER V BOLLINGER: THIS GENERATION'S 
BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION? 
Michelle Adams• 
INTRODUCTION 
WHAT does Brown mean today? To answer that question, we must address the Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger' within the framework 
of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence more generally. Brown, of course, 
held that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"2 that is, that 
"segregation of [minority] children in public schools," deprives them of "equal 
educational opportunities."3 Contained within Brown was the promise of 
integration. The promise was that by eliminating de jure segregation, the 
architecture of white subordination could be made to crumble, and that all 
Americans, through enhanced intergroup and interpersonal contact, would become 
more fully equipped to meet the challenges of a complex and ever-changing modern 
society. 
But if we look at the wide sweep of the Brown implementation cases we see, 
instead, a Court that was never able to come to terms with Brown's promise.4 The 
reality is that the Supreme Court has simply withdrawn from the continuing and 
extraordinarily difficult problem of desegregating the public schools on the K-12 
level.5 Today, K-12 school segregation is on the rise,6 and "desegregation" has 
become part of a bygone era. Quite simply, the Supreme Court has moved on. So 
to the extent that Brown survives in any real way today, it does so through the force 
of the idea it championed-which was the importance ofracial integration-rather 
than because it stands for any firm and incontrovertible mandate that secondary 
schools must be desegregated. 
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954). 
3. Id. at 493. 
4. Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future 
47 HOWARD L.J. (forthcoming 2004). 
5. Erwin Chemerinsky, Courts Must Share the Blame for the Failure to Desegregate Public 
Schools 3 0-3 8, available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg02/chemerinsky 
.pdf(Aug. 15, 2002). 
6. See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield,A Multiracial Society with Segregated 
Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? 4-6, available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/ Are W eLosingtbeDream. pdf (Jan. 16, 
2003). 
755 
756 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Now consider the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence. Prior to 
Grutter, the Court's most recent pronouncements on affirmative action fell into two 
general categories: cases having to do with the use of racial preferences in meting 
out an employment benefit or opportunity, and cases dealing with the use of race 
in structuring electoral districts in the voting rights context.7 In both of these areas, 
the Court suggested that racial preferences assisting minority group members were 
unlikely to pass constitutional muster.8 Yet in Grutter, the Court not only allows 
racial preferences to be used in a manner that burdened white applicants to the 
University of Michigan Law School, but does so with some enthusiasm.9 Thus, a 
well-informed observer might marvel at the Court's pronouncement in Grutter 
given its abandonment of the demands of K-12 desegregation and its professed 
"skepticism" with respect to all racial classification schemes, whether benign or 
invidious. 10 
Given all of this, how does one explain Grutter? One answer is that Grutter is 
this generation's Brown, presenting a "solution" to the terribly difficult and divisive 
racial question of our time, but through a method that simultaneously cleaves to 
high ideal, while recoiling from specificity with respect to enforcement. In this 
way, Grutter mimics Brown, following its methodology and accepting the propriety 
ofits overriding theme. In Grutter, as in Brown, the Court: (1) accepted rather than 
denied that there was a deeply divisive and enduring social problem at issue; 
(2) found a way to "solve" that problem through a resort to "high ideals" affecting 
society as a whole rather than just minority group members; and finally 
(3) distanced itself from the actual machinations of how diversity would be 
implemented.11 
Understanding Grutter from this perspective also helps to explain the seeming 
disconnect between the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence and 
Grutter' s outcome. At first blush, Grutter appears to be a deviation from the body 
of the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence: it says "yes" where the other 
cases said "no." But it is not so clear that Grutter is a deviation from current law. 
Instead, it might be seen as consistent with it, in that the justification for the racial 
preference recognized in Grutter transcended the justifications offered in the 
previous cases, and the method used to achieve that end, "race as a factor," diffused 
rather than highlighted race. From this perspective, Grutter addressed several 
concerns that had troubled the Court for many years, reorientating the affirmative 
action problem away from explicitly addressing the harms experienced by minority 
group members toward a more prospective orientation which asks: what's best for 
the country moving forward? Grutter thus answered the question of how it might 
be possible to sustain an affirmative action plan once it was clear that strict scrutiny 
applied. The answer is by reliance on the same underlying rationale that was 
recognized in Brown: the importance ofracial integration to American society. 
7. See infra part II. 
8. See id. 
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-41. 
10. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-224 (1995). 
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339-42 (2003). 
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Thus, Grutter might be understood as this generation's Brown v. Board of 
Education because it managed to reinvigorate the judicial commitment to 
affirmative action (which is after all the preeminent civil rights policy of our time) 
by a clear commitment to the same abstract principle that commanded the Court in 
Brown: racial integration. At the same time, the Grutter Court used essentially the 
same analytical process--commitment to high ideal, refrain from detail-that was 
favored in Brown. Both cases, then, are examples of equal protection jurisprudence 
on the level of high theory. The animating rationale in each is an abiding belief in 
the importance of race mixing or diversity for society's sake. They are both 
prospective, rather than retrospective decisions. But, of course, if this is true, the 
question that remains to be answered, particularly given the Grutter Court's twenty-
five year "phase out" reference, 12 is whether the same pattern that obtained after 
Brown will be repeated: invocation of high and deeply important principle,judicial 
inattention, articulation of a more detailed enforcement framework, and then 
ultimately retreat. 
I. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND RACIAL INTEGRATION 
Brown v. Board of Education, of course, was the culmination of a lengthy and 
protracted litigation strategy which sought to destroy de Jure segregation in all 
phases of American life. 13 The strategy was incremental, and by the time the Brown 
litigation reached the Supreme Court, the Court was finally prepared to deal with 
a vexing and highly contested issue: the propriety of state-mandated segregation in 
American public schools. 14 The background and facts of the Brown decision are 
quite well known. 15 The case challenged de Jure segregation in four states on the 
theory that "segregated public schools are not 'equal' and cannot be made 'equal,"' 
and thus were a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 16 
The Court agreed and ruled that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place."17 
The significance of Brown is difficult to overestimate. However, it is important 
to remember that in Brown the Court was only prepared to go so far. Brown I 
confined itself to the field of public secondary education and did not even reach the 
question of the appropriate remedy for the harm that it had defined. The larger 
question of the propriety of de Jure segregation in other phases of American life 
would have to wait until a later date. How did the Brown Court go about "solving" 
the incredibly divisive issue of state-mandated segregation in the public schools? 
It articulated constitutional principle as high ideal, and that ideal was racial 
integration. 
12. Id. at 342. 
13. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE ( 1977) ( outlining the history of Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ.). 
14. MARK C. TuSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1936-1961, at 203-04 (1994). 
15. See generally KLUGER, supra note 13. 
16. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
17. Id. at 495. 
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Elsewhere I have suggested that Brown articulated a v1S1onary notion of 
integration that was comprised of two major components: the "minority access" 
perspective and the "diversity" perspective. 18 On the one hand, Brown could be 
seen from a rights-based or rights-granting perspective as providing minority group 
members with access to white-dominated institutions, such as southern public 
schools. On this view, Brown's desegregation mandate arises from the 
understanding that the "only way to undo the myriad harms created by state-
imposed segregation is to disestablish the architecture of subordination that defined 
that system."19 Thus, Brown from the "minority access" perspective stood for the 
proposition that integration was the appropriate remedy for state-mandated 
segregation's victims, given the significance of the harm. Brown also articulated 
a second, independent rationale for the desegregation mandate that is of particular 
import for our discussion here: the "diversity" perspective.20 In Brown, the Court 
recognized that integration had a significant and independent value outside of the 
opportunities created for minority group members through the process of 
desegregation. This was the case because of the intimate relationship among 
education, democracy, and citizenship.21 
The Brown Court's ruling hinged on the significance of education in American 
public life, thus the Court's statement that education was perhaps the "most 
important function of state and local govemments."22 Because education 
established the foundation of good citizenship, enhanced stable values, and 
provided the child with a foundation for further professional study in later life, it 
had to be provided to all on equal terms.23 Thus, black children could not be 
deprived of an equal education, because education was so important to the 
development and later success of the individual as a person and as a member of 
society.24 
The opinion also traced the source of the Equal Protection Clause violation to the 
importance education plays in the lives of all Americans.25 The Court suggested 
that the importance of the requirement that all children be provided with an equal 
educational opportunity transcended the specific needs of black children. The Court 
particularly emphasized the relationship between education and our social and 
political system. 26 While children lacking access to equal educational opportunities 
might well be deprived of an important social good, society would also be positively 
benefited by the presence of children possessing the ability to become good and 
useful citizens, holding values consistent with those of the larger society: thus 
leading to the Court's observation that "education is the very foundation of good 
citizenship," and the Court's emphasis on the relationship between education, 
18. Adams, supra note 4. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
23. Id. 
24. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
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cultural values, and normal adjustment.27 This, then, was the diversity perspective: 
American society on the whole benefits when all children have equal access to 
educational opportunities. 
In providing a solution to one of the most vexing social and political issues of 
that day ( or any other), Brown spoke in the language of abstract principle, endorsing 
racial integration as a beneficial aim, but shying away from the thorny realities of 
its implementation. This, of course, was borne out by the fact that in Brown I the 
Court failed to reach the question of remedy.28 Similarly, in Brown II, which has 
been amply and justifiably criticized, the Court issued a vague mandate which 
simultaneously appeased Southern recalcitrance and shifted the burden of 
implementation of that mandate to the lower federal courts.29 Brown II revealed the 
Court's disengagement from the realities of implementing Brown I's mandate. The 
Court's deep-seated ambiguity set the stage for later judicial developments which 
have resulted in, at best, only a partial fulfillment of Brown I's promise. 
Combined with Brown's mandate that (at least in theory) students of different 
backgrounds would attend the same schools, Brown from the diversity perspective 
envisioned an American society that the Grutter Court inherited almost fifty years 
later. This vision suggested that American society could be improved through racial 
integration; that both blacks and whites stood to benefit from enhanced and 
sustained contact and the "spillover" effects of race-mixing. This vision, however, 
was articulated in the most abstract and thus most appealing terms: education, 
democracy, citizenship, and values. It is this vision which Grutter v. Bollinger 
shares. 
II. SITUATING GR UTTER WITHIN RECENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOCTRINE 
In order to understand how Grutter v. Bollinger might be seen as this generation's 
Brown v. Board of Education, it is necessary to situate the Grutter case within 
recent affirmative action doctrine. Grutter surprised a great many in the civil rights 
community, along with Court-watchers generally.30 That surprise was due at the 
least in part to the fact that Grutter differed significantly in both outcome and the 
language and reasoning used to reach that result from the Court's recent affirmative 
action decisions.31 The outcome in Gratz v. Bollinger32 notwithstanding, Grutter 
has delighted as many advocates of affirmative action as it has angered its 
27. Id. 
28. See id. at 495. 
29. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 13 (outlining the history of Brown). 
30. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity in Education," 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622-23 (2003). 
31. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.Pena,515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993); Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986). 
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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opponents.33 I suggest that one way to understand Grutter is that it solves some of 
the problems suggested in the earlier affirmative action cases. 
One question is why the difference in outcomes in Grutter and cases like Wygant 
v. Jackson Board of Education, 34 Richmond v. Croson, 35 Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena,36 and Shaw v. Reno?37 If, in fact, all racial classification schemes are 
'"simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification,"'38 what is it about the use ofrace in Grutter that 
allayed the Court's skepticism about racial classifications? And what is it about the 
use of race in the employment and voting rights contexts that confirmed those 
suspicions? 
One could take a variety of approaches in answering this question. One might 
probe the use of strict scrutiny in each context and search for differences in the 
test's application. One might fixate on the different styles and philosophy of each 
opinion's author (which is very tempting given the fact that Justice O'Connor is the 
author of the majority opinion in so many of the affirmative action cases). Or one 
might attempt to situate each opinion in its particular timeframe and ask, were the 
executive and legislative branches dominated by Democrats or Republicans at the 
time the opinion was decided? Was the civil rights community better or less well 
organized at a particular point in time? What role did amicus briefs and other types 
of organizing play in influencing the Court? 
These are all valid and important approaches to answering the question. But I 
approach the question from another perspective: I ask not just how is voting 
different from employment, or how is higher education unique, but what larger 
values are promoted or protected in each context mentioned. I also ask how are 
those values secured? Does the process used to achieve racial diversity highlight 
racial differences, or does it seek to downplay and obscure them? Ultimately, I 
suggest there is a relationship between the answers to these questions and our 
current understanding of Brown v. Board of Education. 
A. Intergroup Competition for Jobs and Employment Opportunities 
The Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence in the employment context39 
has taken place in the context of fierce competition between members of racially 
33. See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz & Tomislav Ladika, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action, 
Rejects Point System, MICH. DAILY, June 24, 2003, available atwww.michigandaily.com ("Civil rights 
leaders and University officials ... express[ ed] their delight. .... But recent University graduate James 
Justin Wilson ... [ said] 'This is the worst decision .... "'). 
34. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that the school board's use of race for giving preferential 
treatment in layoffs was unconstitutional). 
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) {holding percentage of subcontractor contracts based on used of 
minorities was unconstitutional). 
36. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding racial classifications needed to meet strict scrutiny). 
37. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding North Carolina's redistricting plan unconstitutional on the 
basis ofracial motivations). 
38. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
39. I define "employment" broadly to include racial classifications that impact individuals on the 
job as well as those classifications that might have some impact on the ability to obtain contracts in a 
competitive bidding environment. Either way, the use of the racial classification alters either an 
existing or potential employment opportunity. 
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defined groups for jobs and other employment oppmiunities. In the context of this 
competition, the Court has been called upon to determine whether racial preferences 
could be used to "even the playing field" for new entrants into particular 
employment markets. Wygantv. Jackson Board of Education, Richmondv. Croson, 
andAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena demonstrate the Court's refusal to interfere 
in the employment context and disrupt the "natural" mechanizations of the market, 
and its propensity to accept rather than deny the ongoing and pervasive nature of 
racial discrimination in those markets. The employment cases, by their very nature, 
required the Court to take a position on the influence of the past on the present and 
to weigh and balance the propriety of racial preferences against that background. 
Ultimately, the interests put forward by the government to justify the use of racial 
preferences, which necessarily required recognition of the continuing effect of past 
discrimination, were simply not significant enough to justify those preferences. 
1. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Prior to 1953, no black teachers had been employed in the Jackson public 
schools.40 By the early 1970's, the situation had improved somewhat, but the 
number of black children attending the Jackson public schools far exceeded the 
number of black teachers.41 At the same time, Jackson public school teachers were 
polled with respect to their views on the then existing layoff policy, and the vast 
majority favored the extant policy, which mandated that teachers be laid off on a 
straight seniority basis should termination become necessary.42 
In 1972, contract renegotiations coincided with an outbreak of racial violence in 
the Jackson school system.43 That same year, the Jackson Education Association, 
the Jackson school teachers' collective bargaining unit, ratified a contract that 
explicitly recognized "the desirability of multi-ethnic representation on the teaching 
faculty," and sought as a goal that the percentage of minority faculty match that of 
the student population. 44 Thus, under the newly adopted agreement, white teachers 
with more seniority could be laid off before minority teachers with fewer years on 
the job.45 The theory animating the preference was that minority teachers were 
instrumental in providing something very important to their students. As the district 
court below put it, "minority teachers are role models for minority students. This 
is vitally important because societal discrimination has often deprived minority 
children of other role-models."46 
In Wygant, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's ruling upholding the 
collective bargaining agreement against challenge by laid off white teachers with 
more seniority.47 In a plurality decision, Justice Powell ruled that the appropriate 
40. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1198. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. at 120 I. 
47. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,273 (1986). 
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standard of review was strict scrutiny.48 "Strict scrutiny," of course, requires the 
government actor seeking to justify its affirmative action plan to demonstrate that 
the plan is animated by a "compelling governmental interest" and that that interest 
is "narrowly tailored" to achieve the government's objective.49 
Justice Powell ruled that the layoff plan was not supported by a compelling 
interest: ameliorating the effects of societal discrimination by providing minority 
"role models" was simply insufficient, and any argument that the layoff plan was 
an appropriate remedy for the Board's prior discrimination also failed because there 
was an inadequate evidentiary basis upon which to support that conclusion.50 
Key to Justice Powell's decision was the narrow tailoring analysis. In Wygant, 
the Court ruled that the layoff plan was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the 
interest ofremediating past discrimination.51 In this portion of the decision, Justice 
Powell emphasized the impact of a layoff scheme on "innocent" parties; white 
teachers with more seniority were clearly and unambiguously injured under the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.52 From Justice Powell's perspective, 
hiring goals were much preferred because they were more "diffuse," spreading the 
costs of achieving the affirmative action plan's goals "among society generally."53 
From this perspective, one might see Wygant as a case that protected the interests 
of the laid off white teachers as against those of the more newly hired black faculty. 
Of course, the interests of those white teachers had presumably been protected by 
their collective bargaining unit. The problem was as "victims" of the new layoff 
policy, they now sought to renegotiate the outcome of that bargain. On this view, 
Wygant is a case about competition between racial groups in the employment 
context where there was a significant prize at issue. Black faculty were new 
entrants into the competitive market for teachers in the Jackson public schools. 
They had been kept out of that market for a long period of time because of racial 
discrimination.54 The jobs at issue were good union jobs that typically offer job 
security, health care, some expectation of enhanced salary overtime, some level of 
prestige, protection with respect to work duties and hours, and some level of work 
time flexibility (i.e., relatively free summers, perhaps shorter hours). 
The upshot of Justice Powell's decision is that the desire to ameliorate societal 
discrimination by providing effective "role models" for black students in the 
Jackson public school system was not significant enough to justify clearly and 
unambiguously harming those who the Court viewed as "innocent victims" of a 
48. Id. at 273-7 4. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 274-79. 
51. Id. at 283-84. 
52. See id. at 282. 
53. Id. at 282-83. As Justice Powell put it, "[l]ayoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way 
that general hiring goals do not." Id. at 283. 
54. The Board, of course, had attempted to argue that it had engaged in employment 
discrimination in order to justify the layoff plan, but Justice Powell rejected this attempt because there 
had never been any judicial finding of employment discrimination against the Jackson School Board. 
Id. at 277-78. There was, however, no dispute in the case, that the lack of black teachers before 1953 
and the relatively small number of black faculty in the Jackson schools at the time of the adoption of 
the collective bargaining unit would be attributed to "societal discrimination." See id. at 276. 
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misguided collective bargaining agreement. The desire to ameliorate societal 
discrimination has at least two problems. 
First, allowing societal discrimination to form the basis of a compelling interest 
that might insulate an affirmative action plan from constitutional attack requires 
accepting the fact of the ubiquitousness of discrimination and the profound 
disadvantage and exclusion visited upon blacks until extremely recently. The 
previous de Jure discriminatory regime was of such a magnitude, so all-
encompassing, as to occasion disbelief from the more modern observant. Instead, 
the reaction from many well-adjusted, forward-thinking individuals is simply to 
ignore the sweep of the previous discriminatory system. The problem is just so 
enormous that the tendency is to deny it. Thus, the acceptance of the societal 
discrimination compelling interest requires a rejection of the desire to deny. 
Second, if the societal discrimination compelling interest requires acceptance of 
an enormous social problem, the "role model" rationale seems too insignificant to 
justify so clearly "harming" innocent individuals. In the context of what I suggest 
was a competitive problem, it seems incongruent to determine the winner of a 
contest between two groups for societal benefits by suggesting that one group can 
provide marginally better psychological outcomes to the consumers of the services 
whom members of either group could adequately serve. To the extent that one 
views K-12 education as primarily centered on the transfer of knowledge and 
information (as distinct from the development of the individual outside of 
knowledge transfer or as having significant spillover effects in other areas), the role 
model justification simply is not important enough to justify departure from the 
norm. As I suggest below, I think the Grutter Court perceived education differently 
than the Wygant Comi. 
2. Richmond v. Croson and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Remediating 
Competitive Disputes Arising.from the Present Effects of Past Discriminatory 
Conduct 
Richmond v. Croson and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena both concerned 
affirmative action plans that attempted to "even the playing field" for competitive 
bidding opportunities. In both cases, the governmental actor tried to justify its 
affirmative action plan as an attempt to remediate the present effects of past 
discriminatory conduct. I suggest that, as was the case in Wygant, there are 
powerful disincentives militating against recognizing the ongoing effects of prior 
discrimination. It is useful to view the Croson/Adarand line of cases as consistent 
with Wygant, that is, as primarily concerned with mediating intergroup competition. 
Richmond v. Croson concerned the city of Richmond's affirmative action 
program, which set aside 30% of all city contracts for minority business 
enterprises.55 Let us take a few steps back and focus on exactly what the Richmond 
City Council was attempting to achieve with the set-aside program. At the time the 
set-aside program was created, there were very few minority contractors in 
55. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 
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existence eligible to compete for city contracts; the reality was that the construction 
industry in the surrounding area was completely white-dominated. 56 
The council's rationale for the set-aside was to mitigate the effects of past 
exclusionary practices on minority contractors.57 The set-aside program was 
intended to remedy the present effects of past discriminatory conduct that had 
resulted in a very small percentage of minority members in area trade associations, 
a small number of minority business enterprises involved in the construction trade, 
and a small number of city contracts awarded to minority firms. 58 Thus, the 
contracting program was an inclusionary mechanism created to disrupt patterns of 
exclusion in the contracting industry.59 One way oflooking at the set-aside program 
is as a mechanism intended to "even the playing field" between white and minority 
contractors. The set-aside thereby enhanced competition overall for city contracts 
and reduced the benefits enjoyed by white contractors in the Richmond area that 
had accrued through generations of past discriminatory activities. 
Nevertheless, the Court struck the program down.6° For the Court, the program 
was problematic for several reasons; I want to focus here on just one. Justice 
O'Connor, writing for a plurality, was particularly concerned about the fact that a· 
majority of the Richmond city council was black.61 The assertion was that the 
Richmond set-aside program was more suspicious because the black "majority" was 
advantaging itself at the expense of the white "minority," which has been injured 
by the program.62 The insinuation was that the set-aside program was simply part 
of a political spoils system, which canceled out any honest attempt to rectify past 
wrongs. This assertion also required one to believe that the white dominated 
construction industry would cease to enjoy influence on the actions of the city 
council because it was minority dominated. 
But what I think is most important to note in thinking about the Richmond city 
council's predicament, is the role the Court cast itself in. It is important to 
remember that, at base, the dispute was between two contracting firms, one black 
and one white, for a city plumbing contract. A lower bidding white contractor 
challenged the set-aside plan arguing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.63 
Thus, the question the Court was ultimately forced to answer centered on how to 
mediate a competitive dispute between two parties for an economic benefit. Indeed, 
the Court framed the issue in competitive terms, suggesting that "[t]he Richmond 
Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of 
public contracts based solely upon their race."64 
The competitive perspective is important to keep in mind as we analyze how the 
Court reached its conclusion. Croson, of course, rejected the notion that the "sorry 
history of both private and public discrimination in this country" was relevant 
56. Id. at 480. 
57. Id. at 537 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
58. See id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
59. See id. at 543 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 470. 
61. See id. at 495-96. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 482-83. 
64. Id. at 493. 
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absent a showing of "identified discrimination" on the part of either the 
governmental entity or private actor that the governmental entity has aided or 
abetted, for the purposes of justifying an affirmative action plan. 65 But, of course, 
once the history of past discrimination (and its continuing effects) drops out, the 
question then becomes: is it appropriate to allow a black dominated city council to 
help its own? The removal of this history ( or one might say denial), left the Court 
to focus on contractual relationships, bidding requirements, and small business 
capitalization.66 The canvas was undeniably smaller, and the Court was no longer 
deciding large and momentous social issues prospectively. Instead, the issues in the 
case appeared to be localized, and perhaps even parochial. The Court was no longer 
adjudicating a historic affirmative action case in the "former capital of the 
Confederacy,"67 but was concerned about a parochial "payback" scheme engineered 
by a local government so possessed of its own power that it even granted 
preferences to Eskimos and Aleuts. 68 
The same analysis is relevant to the issue in Adarand. Croson had suggested that 
because of the unique role accorded to Congress under Section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment, and the skepticism displayed towards states in Section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment, perhaps the federal government might be better suited to "identify and 
redress the effects of society-wide discrimination."69 Perhaps it was inappropriate 
for the black-dominated Richmond city council to create a set-aside program, but 
it might be a different question altogether if the federal legislature, the most 
representative branch of the federal government, made the same decision. 70 
Adarand proved that supposition false. 
At issue in Adarand was a federal program that provided a financial incentive to 
general contractors working on federal contracts to subcontract part of the dollar 
amount of the contract to "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."71 
Under the program, minority group members were presumed to be socially and 
economically disadvantaged.72 The Court ruled that all racial preferences whether 
created by the state or federal government, whether benign or invidious, were to be 
assessed under the same standard-strict scrutiny. 73 In so doing, Adarand 
essentially incorporated the same level of searching judicial scrutiny that had been 
applied in Croson to affirmative action plans created by the federal government. 
As twin contracting cases, much of the analysis with respect to Croson is 
applicable to Adarand as well. I would add the following observation to unify the 
two cases. Both cases turn on the question of whether the government can justify 
its affinnative action plan on the theory of remediating the present effects of past 
discriminatory conduct. But, of course, evaluation of such a question requires the 
Court to accept that such effects continue. 
65. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1989). 
66. See id. at 509-11. 
67. Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
68. See id. at 506. 
69. Croson, 488 US. at 490. 
70. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-79 (1980). 
71. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,200 (1995). 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 227. 
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One possibility might be that the inequalities we observe between black and 
whites today are largely caused by the present effects of past discriminatory 
conduct. This was essentially Justice Marshall's position in Croson.14 Another 
possibility might be to presume that the inequalities we observe today have little or 
nothing to do with the continuing effects of past discriminatory conduct, essentially 
the theory that a significant amount of time has passed since the end of Jim Crow, 
and there is no longer an unbroken chain of causation between past discrimination 
and present inequality.75 Finally, one might also take a position somewhere 
between these two poles. 
But no matter where one falls on the spectrum, it requires the evaluator to take 
a position on the effects of the past on the present. That is, the "remediating [ of] 
the present effects of past discriminatory conduct" compelling interest requires the 
judge to evaluate the demands of the equal protection clause from a historical 
perspective. Such an analysis is inherently uncomfortable. This is the case because 
by the very nature of the compelling interest itself, the decisionmaker is drawn into 
an evaluation of conduct, mind-set, and culture that the judge might otherwise 
prefer to deny.76 Given this, the ability to arrive at a conclusion in such contentious 
cases, which speaks prospectively as opposed to retrospectively, is quite attractive. 
3. Affirmative Action in the Voting Context: Shaw v. Reno 
As we saw in the employment context, the Court has ignored the impact of the 
present effects of past discrimination and has largely refused to permit racial 
preferences to "even the playing field" between racially defined groups. At the 
same time, as recent voting rights cases suggest, the Court has also been 
extraordinarily sensitive to the "message" sent by governmental race conscious 
actions. 
At issue in Shaw v. Reno was the constitutionality of two "majority-minority" 
congressional districts. North Carolina had drawn the first district after the 1990 
census, which entitled it to an additional seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.77 Because North Carolina is a "covered jurisdiction" under 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,78 all electoral changes had to be submitted 
to the U.S. Attorney General for approval.79 The Attorney General objected to the 
74. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
7 5. See generally Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 643 (2000) (discussing the burden some federal courts have placed on defendants in 
defending their affirmative action plans to show causation between defendants past discriminatory 
conduct and the present effects of that past conduct). 
76. Indeed, only Justice Ginsburg has shown the propensity to regularly engage in historical 
analysis in the context of affirmative action and school desegregation determinations. See Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
342-43 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 175 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
77. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,633 (1993). 
78. Id. at 634. 
79. Id. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act also allows covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance 
from a three judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973c (2000). 
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state's original plan, and the state passed new legislation to add an additional 
majority-minority district.Bo Both districts became the subject of the litigation 
which culminated in the Shaw case. 
The districts were challenged on the theory that their "dramatically irregular 
shape" constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.BI The scope of the 
challenge was unusual. Instead of presenting a more typical vote dilution claim, 
plaintiffs argued that the redistricting scheme violated their right to participate in 
a "colorblind" electoral process.B2 Consequently, there was no argument in the case 
that white voters in North Carolina had experienced any diminution in their overall 
voting power. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, ruled that the two 
districts were so bizarrely shaped as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment.B3 The districts' irregularity sent the unmistakable message that 
they were drawn "as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without 
regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling 
justification. "84 
What was the nature of the harm identified by Justice O'Connor? It was not loss 
of political power. Instead the harm has been characterized as expressive in 
nature. 85 The problem was that the state was expressing an idea through its 
redistricting scheme that the Court said was an anathema to the 14th Amendment. 
That idea was "political apartheid. "86 The state sent the impermissible and 
inappropriate message by creating two bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts 
that "members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education, 
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same 
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. "87 This message, 
which the Court said was grounded in "impermissible racial stereotypes," also 
presented a potentially even greater harm,88 which is that such districts with their 
message of solid boundaries between racial groups, carried the risk of forever 
balkanizing us into "competing racial factions" that "carry us further from the goal 
of a political system in which race no longer matters."89 
From this perspective, one might see the two bizarrely shaped districts in Shaw 
as threats to "colorblindness," which the Court has now said is a constitutional 
imperative.90 Shaw suggests that the society we are working toward should be one 
where race truly does not matter, such that the government should never take race 
into consideration in decisionmaking. As I discuss below, one might understand the 
harm in Shaw, sending the message that our society is composed of "competing 
80. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635. 
81. Id. at 633-34. 
82. Id. at 641-42. 
83. Id. at 644. 
84. Id. at 642. 
85. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 485 
(1993). 
86. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. 
87. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 657. 
90. See id. at 648-49. 
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racial factions," as a threat to at least one conception of integration that was 
recognized as a positive social good in Grutter. 
Subsequent doctrinal development suggests that the Court has "taken its foot off 
the accelerator" to some extent in the voting rights cases. For instance, in Miller 
v. Johnson, 91 the Court further clarified the standard from Shmv. As it turned out, 
"bizarreness" was not necessarily the touchstone; the real question was whether 
"race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a 
significant number of voters within or without a particular district."92 After Miller, 
the key seemed to be whether race was a predominant and overriding factor, rather 
than merely a consideration in the redistricting process.93 In evaluating race-
conscious districting, the Court would ask: has the legislature subordinated 
traditional districting principles to race?94 As has been noted, this kind of 
evaluation maps onto the question of whether a university has used "race as a plus 
factor" in admissions determinations.95 
Finally, even more recent voting rights cases suggest that legislatures can take 
race into account where race is used instrumentally to achieve other, legitimate 
governmental aims. For instance, in Easley v. Cromartie,96 the Court rnled that 
legislatures could use race as a factor in districting where their motivation was 
predominantly political as opposed to racial.97 Thus, "caution is especially 
appropriate ... where the state has articulated a legitimate political explanation for 
its decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation 
are highly correlated."98 Where it can be shown that black voters consistently vote 
for Democrats, it would be appropriate for the legislature to construct heavily black 
districts in order to protect incumbents or to achieve other legitimate political 
objectives.99 
III. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER: THIS GENERATION'S 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION? 
The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger reaches a different conclusion with respect to 
the propriety of the affirmative action plan challenged than those I have described 
above. As I explain, Gruffer is different than those cases because the Court is able 
to solve the problem as it defines it, without having to acknowledge some of the 
more contested issues that were at the core of the previous cases. Thus, Grutter is 
different than the previous affinnative action cases in the employment and voting 
rights contexts because both race and the continuing effects of discriminatory 
conduct are subordinated and other more general principles are privileged. This is 
91. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
92. Id. at 916. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing The Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the 
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1569, 1598 (2002). 
96. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
97. Id. at 239 (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)). 
98. Id. at 242. 
99. See id. at 239. 
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consistent with the approach taken in Brown. In this way, Grutter mimics Brown: 
both cases seek to solve the extraordinarily difficult racial problem of their era by 
articulating the need for integration at a high level of generality, such that many (but 
certainly not all) Americans will find it difficult to disagree with the Court's 
premise. 
At issue in Grutter was the University of Michigan Law School's admissions 
policy which used race as a "plus" factor in determining who would be admitted to 
the class. 100 The law school's goal was to attain a "critical mass of under-
represented minority students." 101 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, ruled 
that the law school's admissions policy, which emphasized a "highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant's file," did not violate Equal Protection, 
notwithstanding the fact that race was likely "outcome determinative" in many 
cases. 102 
For our purposes, I focus on two aspects of the majority decision that are 
particularly pertinent to our discussion of what Brown means today. First, it is 
important to describe the nature of the "compelling interest," which the Court 
recognized as sufficient to justify the law school's affirmative action plan. The 
compelling interest recognized in Grutter, that of "student body diversity" in the 
context of higher education, 103 was deeply instrumental. The justification for the 
plan was its importance in structuring intergroup relationships prospectively, rather 
than addressing harms that had occurred in the past. 104 
In Grutter, the problem, as the Court saw it, was the exclusion of many minority 
group members from participation in selective educational institutions in the 
absence of affirmative action. This was borne out by the Court's decision to defer 
to the law school's educational judgment with respect to its admissions process, 105 
and its recognition of the link between access to educational opportunity and the 
development of a leadership class with "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry."106 
But it is very important to understand that in upholding the law school's admission 
plan, the Court did not do so on the basis of any present or past discriminatory 
conduct Grutter, after all, centered on the legitimacy of the "diversity" interest 
rather than any argument that the affirmative action plan could be justified as a 
remedy for the present effects of past discriminatory conduct. 107 I suggest that the 
University of Michigan's affirmative action plan was upheld precisely because it 
benefited interests outside those of minority group members. 
Contrast this with the Court's approach in the employment cases. Wygant, 
Croson, and Adarand all presented the Court with thorny intergroup competition 
problems. The underlying problem in those cases was overt and undeniable: 
100. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-40 (2003). 
101. Id. at 325. 
102. Id. at 338-39. 
I 03. Id. at 332-33. 
104. See id. 
105. Id. at 332. 
106. Id. at 335. The law school's expert, Dr. Raudenbush, testified.that "a race-blind admissions 
system would have a 'very dramatic' negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions." Id. 
at 327. 
107. See id. at 332-35. 
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members of particular ~thnic groups were competing for access to employment 
opportunities. While it is true that Grutter also presents a competition problem 
(members of a variety of minority groups were "competing" against each other for 
entrance into the law school), there was no higher, more "objective" general 
principle that could be referred to in the employment context to mediate the conflict 
between groups. In the earlier employment cases, the general principle that was 
said to justify the use of racial classifications was remediating the present effects 
of past discriminatory conduct. 108 But the problem with that general principle is that 
it forces the decisionmaker to recognize the extent and nature of racism in American 
society and, once that reality has been recognized, to openly "take a side" in a social 
and economic contest. 
In Grutter, the deeply divisive and enduring social problem was the lack of 
sufficient racial diversity in selective educational institutions in the absence of 
affirmative action, which has large spillover ramifications. From this perspective, 
the law school's affirmative action plan was not an attempt to address racial 
inequality, but rather functioned to address the disconnect between white 
domination in the corporate, military, and governmental spheres, and the·demands 
of an increasingly multicultural society. The law school's interest was sufficiently 
compelling because a racially diverse class leads to diversity in other areas of 
American society, which ultimately inures to the benefit of everyone. 109 The Court 
also recognized that contact among members of different racial groups promotes 
"cross-racial understanding" and "helps to break down racial stereotypes."110 Thus, 
the compelling interest recognized in Grutter was the importance of racial 
integration broadly defined. 
The second aspect of the Court's ruling that deserves mention is the selection 
process it favored in seeking to achieve that compelling governmental interest. In 
Gratz v. Bollinger,111 the Court struck down the admissions process used by the 
University of Michigan to select undergraduates. 112 The problem with the 
undergraduate admissions plan was that it awarded "mechanical, predetermined 
diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."113 In contrast, the law school 
emphasized individualistic review, flexibility, and competition among all applicants 
for admission to the class.114 Thus, the process by which the law school chose its 
class was consistent with the underlying goal, which was integration defined 
broadly. At the same time, the process deemphasized overt, mechanical uses of 
race, and favored covert, more subtle uses of racial classifications. 
Contrast the law school's process for selecting applicants to the use of race in the 
recent voting rights cases. In Shaw, the two districts' "dramatically irregular shape" 
sent an overt signal that race was being privileged. 115 That message, from Justice 
O'Connor's perspective, was particularly harmful because it had the propensity to 
108. See infra part 11(1)-(2). 
109. See id. at 333-35. 
110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
111. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
112. Id. at 269. 
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
114. See id. at 337-38. 
115. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
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lead to "political apartheid" and Balkanization.116 Such messages were inconsistent 
with a unitary vision of American society. Note, too, Miller v. Johnson, which 
suggests that the underlying problem is really the government actor's use of race in 
a way in which it predominates over other relevant factors. 117 The use ofrace in 
Grutter, on the other hand, resolves the tension suggested in Shaw and Miller. Race 
is used "appropriately" in Grutter, meaning in a way that does not predominate over 
other relevant factors in the admissions process. 
I was sitting on a panel recently, and one of my co-panelists suggested that 
Grutter was perhaps a more important decision than Brown. I think that perhaps my 
co-panelist's assessment was something of an overstatement, but I would suggest 
a refinement to that statement: that Grutter is our generation's Brown. Thus, I do 
think it is worth pondering the relationship between the two cases. If the Brown 
implementation cases are any guide, there is little reason to expect that the Court's 
commitment to affirmative action on the higher education level will be durable. 
From this perspective, the twenty-five year "phase-out" should be understood as the 
time period during which affirmative action's proponents can reasonably expect to 
hold the Court's attention. After that time period has lapsed, one can assume that 
the Court will do as it did in Milliken v. Bradley118 (which was decided 
approximately twenty-five years after Brown) and shift its attention permanently to 
those it believes have been made to pay too high a price in the name of diversity. 
116. Id. 
117. Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,920 (1995). 
118. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
